I generally addressed religion discrimination claims in a separate article today. This particle addresses a very important aspect of those types of cases, the “ministerial exception” which effectively precludes claims of discrimination against religious organizations where the role of the plaintiff involves “ministerial duties”. More about what that means below.
What is the ministerial exception?
The ministerial exception is a judicially created doctrine under U.S. law that exempts certain employment decisions made by religious organizations from scrutiny under employment discrimination statutes. Rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of the free exercise of religion and the prohibition against governmental establishment of religion, the ministerial exception recognizes that religious institutions have a constitutional right to choose their ministers without government interference.
In essence, the doctrine prevents courts from adjudicating claims that would require them to evaluate the qualifications of religious leaders, the duties they perform, or the validity of religious doctrines. As a result, when an employee’s role within a religious organization is deemed to be ministerial, courts generally decline to apply employment discrimination laws—such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)—to disputes over that individual’s employment.
The trigger for application of the exception: the plaintiff has “ministerial” duties
The key question in determining whether the ministerial exception applies often revolves around whether the plaintiff employee performs ministerial duties. Although there is no bright-line test, courts consider several factors, including:
1. The employee’s title or formal designation. Does the organization classify the employee as a minister or a religious leader?
2. The employee’s job responsibilities. Does the employee perform functions central to the religious mission, such as conducting worship services, providing religious instruction, leading prayer, or otherwise conveying the organization’s faith?
3. The employee’s religious training or credentials. Has the individual undergone significant religious education or received ordination?
4. The organization’s perception of the employee’s role. Does the employer regard the individual as a spiritual leader or key figure in advancing the religious mission?
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), established the foundational framework for applying the ministerial exception. In that case, the Court held that a religious school’s “called” teacher, who had religious training, held a formal title as a minister, and performed religious functions, was a ministerial employee. As a result, her employment discrimination claims were barred by the ministerial exception.
Later, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. __ (2020), the Court further clarified that the ministerial exception is not confined to those formally ordained or labeled as ministers. Instead, the critical inquiry is whether the employee’s role involves carrying out the organization’s religious mission and transmitting its faith. Even lay teachers at religious schools, for example, may fall under the ministerial exception if their duties include religious instruction or participation in religious ceremonies.
In sum, if an employee’s duties are considered ministerial—meaning they play a vital role in the religious organization’s spiritual leadership or faith instruction—employment discrimination laws typically will not apply. However, if the employee’s work is more secular in nature or unrelated to the faith’s central mission, the ministerial exception may not shield the employer from claims of discrimination.
The focus is mostly on the ministerial duties of the plaintiff employee, not so much on the employee who is accused of misconduct
In applying the ministerial exception under U.S. law, the focus is not solely on the conduct of the accused person with ministerial functions but also extends to whether the plaintiff held a ministerial role. The ministerial exception, grounded in the First Amendment’s protection of religious autonomy, bars courts from adjudicating employment disputes between religious institutions and employees who qualify as “ministers.” The determination hinges on the roles and functions of the individuals involved, not merely the alleged conduct.
The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified this in key cases. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Court established that the exception applies to employees who perform religious functions, focusing on the plaintiff’s role rather than just the employer’s actions. Cheryl Perich, the plaintiff, was a “called” teacher with significant religious duties, including teaching religion and leading prayers. The Court held that her status as a minister precluded her discrimination claim, emphasizing her job responsibilities over the specifics of the church’s conduct. See id. at 190–92.
This principle was reaffirmed in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020). The Court ruled that two Catholic school teachers, Agnes Morrissey-Berru and Kristen Biel, fell under the ministerial exception because they performed vital religious duties, such as teaching religion and participating in worship, even without formal titles or extensive training. The focus was on their roles within the religious institution, not solely the schools’ alleged discriminatory actions. See id. at 2066–67. The Court noted that “when a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention in disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence.” Id. at 2066.
Lower courts have consistently interpreted these precedents to mean that the ministerial exception’s application depends on the plaintiff’s status as a minister, not just the conduct of the defendant. For example, in Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit applied the exception to a principal of a Catholic school, focusing on her role in religious education and leadership, not merely the archdiocese’s actions.
Thus, for the ministerial exception to apply, courts assess whether the plaintiff had a ministerial role—typically defined by duties involving religious instruction, worship, or leadership—rather than limiting the inquiry to the conduct of the accused religious entity. The exception protects the autonomy of religious organizations in employment matters involving such personnel, irrespective of the specific claims.
