All posts by Drew M. Capuder

Publisher of Drew Capuder's Employment Law Blog. Lawyer with more than 30 years of experience, focusing on employment law, commercial litigation, and mediation. Extensive trial and appellate experience in state and federal courts. Call Drew at 304-333-5261.

FMLA now applies to leave for care of children by same-sex couples

The Unit­ed States Depart­ment of Labor recent­ly issued an Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion 2010–3 which applies leave rights under the Fam­i­ly and Med­ical Leave Act to care of chil­dren by same-sex cou­ples. The US Depart­ment of Labor issued a press release to help explain the Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion. In oth­er words, employ­ees in same-sex rela­tion­ships who qual­i­fy for leave under the FMLA will be enti­tled to pro­tect­ed leave for the qual­i­fy­ing care of their children.

As the DOL’s press release suc­cinct­ly says, the “FMLA allows work­ers to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave dur­ing any 12-month peri­od to care for loved ones or them­selves”. (29 U.S.C. 2612; 29 C.F.R. 825.200).

What is a “son or daughter”?

The key issue was when the child fell into the def­i­n­i­tion of “son or daugh­ter” for the employ­ee seek­ing leave. When does the law rec­og­nize the child as the “son or daugh­ter” of the employee?

Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion 2010–3 sets out the statu­to­ry lan­guage, and same-sex cou­ples now have the nec­es­sary rela­tion­ship to the child through the sta­tus of being “in loco par­en­tis”, which more or less means some­one who “stands in the place” of the par­ent. Here is the dis­cus­sion in the Administrator’s Interpretation:

The FMLA enti­tles an eli­gi­ble employ­ee to take up to 12 work­weeks of job-pro­tect­ed leave, in rel­e­vant part, “[b]ecause of the birth of a son or daugh­ter of the employ­ee and in order to care for such son or daugh­ter,” “[b]ecause of the place­ment of a son or daugh­ter with the employ­ee for adop­tion or fos­ter care,” and to care for a son or daugh­ter with a seri­ous health con­di­tion. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) — ©; 29 C.F.R. § 825.200. The FMLA defines a “son or daugh­ter” as a “bio­log­i­cal, adopt­ed, or fos­ter child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a per­son stand­ing in loco par­en­tis, who is— (A) under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or old­er and inca­pable of self-care because of a men­tal or phys­i­cal dis­abil­i­ty.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.122©, 825.800.

(empha­sis added).

Con­tin­ue read­ing FMLA now applies to leave for care of chil­dren by same-sex cou­ples

Drew Capuder will be speaking on retaliation law on Oct 29–30, 2010 at Oglebay Park in Wheeling

I will be speak­ing (and pre­sent­ing on arti­cle) on recent devel­op­ments in retal­i­a­tion under fed­er­al and West Vir­ginia employ­ment law on either Octo­ber 29 or 30, 2010 at the annu­al con­fer­ence of the West Vir­ginia Employ­ment Lawyers Asso­ci­a­tion. The con­fer­ence will be at Ogle­bay Resort and Con­fer­ence Cen­ter in Wheel­ing, West Vir­ginia. The final sched­ule is not out yet, so I don’t know whether my speech with be on Octo­ber 29 or 30.

Retal­i­a­tion law in recent years has been one of those devel­op­ing areas, and much more often than not the move­ment in the case law has been in the direc­tion of expand­ing pro­tec­tions for employ­ees against retal­i­a­tion. The US Supreme Court espe­cial­ly has focused on retal­i­a­tion law, and has “plugged gaps” in the law for fed­er­al employ­ees to include pro­tec­tion for retal­i­a­tion claims, has low­ered the thresh­old for what is action­able retal­i­a­tion, and has broad­ened the def­i­n­i­tion of “oppo­si­tion” which enti­tles employ­ees to protection.

One of the dan­gers for employ­ers from retal­i­a­tion claims is that, after an employ­ee com­plains about alleged dis­crim­i­na­tion, the employ­er may be guilty of retal­i­a­tion even if a jury decides there was no dis­crim­i­na­tion to sup­port the employee’s orig­i­nal com­plaint. An employ­ee may suc­ceed in a retal­i­a­tion claim as long as his com­plaint was made in good faith, even if the employ­ee was wrong about the com­plaint of discrimination.

In the pri­or 2 years at the annu­al con­fer­ence for WVELA, I spoke and wrote arti­cles on awards of attor­neys’ fees under employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion laws, and on age dis­crim­i­na­tion.

Drew Capuder will be speaking on disability and sexual harassment issues in Morgantown Oct. 20, 2010

I will be speak­ing (and pre­sent­ing arti­cles)  at a sem­i­nar spon­sored by Ster­ling Edu­ca­tion Ser­vices on Octo­ber 20, 2010 in Mor­gan­town, West Vir­ginia, enti­tled “Fun­da­men­tals of Employ­ment Law”.

I will be speak­ing (and pre­sent­ing arti­cles) on “Sex­u­al, Racial, and Oth­er Harass­ment in the Work­place” and “ADA and FMLA Update”.

Here is the full agen­da, and here is the fac­ul­ty infor­ma­tion. The sem­i­nar will pro­vide around 6–8 hours of con­tin­u­ing edu­ca­tion cred­it for lawyers (I don’t know the exact num­ber, but the sem­i­nar is a full day).

You can reg­is­ter for the the sem­i­nar online. For fur­ther infor­ma­tion, you can con­tact Ster­ling, and their num­ber is 715–855-0498.

Sorry boss, I didn’t know you were having sex in the office!!

The West Vir­ginia Supreme Court recent­ly issued an opin­ion deal­ing with one of those stereo­typ­i­cal­ly awk­ward sit­u­a­tions, where an employ­ee alleged­ly stum­bles into a room where the boss is hav­ing sex with a co-work­er. The deci­sion was  Roth v. DeFe­lice­Care, Inc., 226 W. Va. 214, 700 S.E.2d 183 (June 8, 2010) (per curi­am). It was a 3–2 deci­sion, in which the 3‑vote major­i­ty con­sist­ed of Jus­tices Robin Davis, Mar­garet Work­man, and  Thomas McHugh. Jus­tices Menis Ketchum and Brent Ben­jamin dis­sent­ed, and Jus­tice Ketchum wrote a dis­sent­ing opinion.

The Facts–Sex at Work

These are the facts accord­ing to the com­plaint in the law­suit: Tri­cia Roth was a res­pi­ra­to­ry ther­a­pist work­ing at DeFe­lice­Care, Inc. in Ohio Coun­ty, West Vir­ginia, and she was about to go on vaca­tion. She was direct­ed by Leslie DeFe­lice (the male boss/owner) to come to work some­time dur­ing the week­end pre­ced­ing her vaca­tion in June 2006. She was not told a spe­cif­ic time to come to work dur­ing that week­end. When she came to work as ordered, she “observed Defen­dant [Leslie] DeFe­lice and/or Michelle Kel­ly par­tial­ly clothed and in a com­pro­mis­ing posi­tion”. Mr. DeFe­lice instruct­ed Ms. Roth to go into a con­fer­ence room and wait–meanwhile Mr. DeFe­lice and the oth­er employ­ee got all their clothes back on. Mr. DeFe­lice then talked to Ms. Roth and told her to for­get about what she had just seen, and threat­ened Ms. Ross with the loss of her res­pi­ra­to­ry ther­a­py license and the loss of her employment.

Ms. Roth then went on vaca­tion. When she got back from vaca­tion and returned to work, she had a meet­ing with Mr. DeFe­lice that did­n’t go well. Ms. Roth told Mr. DeFe­lice that she had­n’t told any­one about his sex­u­al encounter at work. Mr. DeFe­lice pro­ceed­ed to fire Ms. Roth because “he did not like how she was dressed” and “he did not like the style[/]color of her hair”.

Ms. Roth Files Suit–Case Dismissed

Ms. Roth then filed suit on legal the­o­ries cen­ter­ing around sex dis­crim­i­na­tion and sex­u­al harass­ment, and–bada bing!–the case prompt­ly got dismissed.

Ms. Roth’s com­plaint (the doc­u­ment which starts the law­suit and describes the plain­tiff’s alle­ga­tions) focused on the sex­u­al inci­dent I have described above, but also made alle­ga­tions about oth­er sex­u­al harassment–I will dis­cuss those details below.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Sor­ry boss, I didn’t know you were hav­ing sex in the office!!

Fourth Circuit rules that pension contribution rules may be age biased

The Fourth Cir­cuit Court of Appeals, in an unpub­lished opin­ion, addressed whether an employ­er’s pen­sion con­tri­bu­tion rules may con­sti­tute age dis­crim­i­na­tion under the Age Dis­crim­i­na­tion in Employ­ment Act of 1967, in Equal Employ­ment Oppor­tu­ni­ty Com­mis­sion v. Bal­ti­more Coun­ty, 385 Fed. Appx. 322 (4th Cir. 2010). The unan­i­mous opin­ion was writ­ten by Judge Den­nis Shed, and was joined by Judge Roger Gre­go­ry and Arther L. Alar­con (Senior Judge on Ninth Cir­cuit, sit­ting by designation).

Can you be sexually harassed behind your back?

It might be obvi­ous, but it seems a bit dif­fi­cult to win on a claim for sex­u­al harass­ment where all of the harass­ment occurs behind your back (and by “behind your back”, I mean sit­u­a­tions where the harass­ing behav­ior occurs when the com­plain­ing employ­ee is not phys­i­cal­ly present to expe­ri­ence or hear what is happening).

The Fourth Cir­cuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2009), in a unan­i­mous deci­sion writ­ten by Judge Roger Gre­go­ry in which Judges M. Blane Michael and Robert Bruce King joined.

The Fourth Cir­cuit did­n’t have much dif­fi­cul­ty reach­ing the con­clu­sion that, for any claim alleg­ing a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment (includ­ing sex­u­al harass­ment), you can’t suc­ceed if all of the mis­con­duct about which you com­plain occurred at work when you were not at work.

Twenty-Eight Years of Litigation!!!

This case grows out of an incred­i­bly long his­to­ry of lit­i­ga­tion (includ­ing sev­er­al dif­fer­ent law­suits and appeals (some of which were suc­cess­ful)) filed by Ms. Pueschel against her employ­er, the Fed­er­al Avi­a­tion Admin­is­tra­tion (“FAA”). The lit­i­ga­tion start­ed in 1981 and end­ed with this Fourth Cir­cuit deci­sion in 2009 (I am not kid­ding, and I am not sure this deci­sion marks the end of all of her litigation).

Con­tin­ue read­ing Can you be sex­u­al­ly harassed behind your back?

Jackson County jury awards $2.1 million in age case

On March 17, 2010, a jury in Jack­son Coun­ty in West Vir­ginia award­ed Jerold John Rice Jr. rough­ly $2.1 mil­lion in an age dis­crim­i­na­tion case against The Burke-Par­sons-Bowl­by Cor­po­ra­tion, Stel­la-Jones US Hold­ings Cor­po­ra­tion, and Stel­la-Jones, Inc., tried in Judge Thomas C. Evans III’s court.

Mr. Rice was rep­re­sent­ed by Mark Atkin­son and Paul Framp­ton at Atkin­son & Polak, PLLC, and the defen­dants were rep­re­sent­ed by Roger Wolfe at Jack­son & Kel­ly PLLC in Charleston, and Kevin Hyde at Foley & Lard­ner, LLP in Jack­sonville, Flori­da.

Here is a quick run-down of what was award­ed in the case:

  • Back pay: $142,659 award­ed by jury.
  • Pre-judg­ment inter­est: $11,791.84 from date of ter­mi­na­tion through trial.
  • Front pay: $1,991,332.00 award­ed by jury (from rough­ly age 48 through retire­ment age at 67).
  • Emo­tion­al dis­tress: $0.
  • Puni­tive dam­ages: Jury did not answer ques­tion affir­ma­tive­ly which would have allowed award of puni­tive damages.
  • Total judg­ment based on jury’s ver­dict: $2,145,782.84, plus post-judg­ment inter­est on that amount at 7% per annum.
  • Attor­neys’ fees: $117,235 award­ed by judge (based on $450 an hour for Mark Atkin­son and $300 per hour for Paul Framp­ton).
  • Lit­i­ga­tion expens­es: $20,324.16 award­ed by judge.
  • Total award: $2,283,342.00 (based on jury ver­dict, pre-judg­ment inter­est, attor­neys’ fees and expens­es) plus post-judg­ment inter­est at 7% per annum.

The Rice case illus­trates the risk employ­ers face when they ter­mi­nate an old­er, good, long-stand­ing employ­ee, and replace him or her with a much younger per­son with lit­tle or no expe­ri­ence for the employer.

What Happened?

Mr. Rice at the time of his ter­mi­na­tion (in 2009) was age 47 and had worked for Burke-Par­sons-Bowl­by Cor­po­ra­tion for 24 years. When Mr. Rice was ter­mi­nat­ed he was the cor­po­rate controller.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Jack­son Coun­ty jury awards $2.1 mil­lion in age case

Was the boss “merely crude”, or was he sexually harassing her?

Sex­u­al harass­ment claims fre­quent­ly require judges and juries to dis­tin­guish between “mere­ly crude” behav­ior, which does­n’t vio­late the employ­ee’s rights, and “sex­u­al harass­ment”, which does. The Fourth Cir­cuit Court of Appeals addressed that issue in EEOC v. Fair­brook Med­ical Clin­ic, PA, 609 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2010) (opin­ion at Fourth Cir­cuit’s site), and did­n’t have a lot of trou­ble con­clud­ing that the con­duct in issue could rea­son­ably be viewed by a jury as sex­u­al harass­ment, rul­ing in favor of the employ­ee. One of the key issues was whether the con­duct was “severe or per­va­sive” enough to con­sti­tute a “hos­tile work envi­ron­ment”.  The unan­i­mous opin­ion was writ­ten Judge J. Harvie Wilkin­son III, joined by Judges Andre M. Davis and C. Arlen Beam (from the Eighth Cir­cuit).

Doctor on Doctor Harassment at Fairbrook Medical Clinic

Stethoscope Dr. John Kessel was the own­er of Fair­brook Med­ical Clin­ic in South Car­oli­na, and was accused by a for­mer female doc­tor at the clin­ic, Dr. Deb­o­rah Waechter, of sex­u­al­ly harass­ing her. Dr. Kessel was Dr. Waechter’s super­vi­sor. Dr. Waechter worked for him for 3 years and quit, alleged­ly over a broad range of sex­u­al­ly explic­it state­ments made dur­ing most of those 3 years (I’ll dis­cuss the specifics below).

Dr. Waechter’s Lawsuit

Dr. Waechter then filed a charge of dis­crim­i­na­tion with the EEOC, alleg­ing that Dr. Kessel’s behav­ior cre­at­ed a “hos­tile work envi­ron­ment”, and the EEOC then filed suit on behalf of Dr. Waechter against Dr. Kessel’s clin­ic under Title VII of the Civ­il Rights Act of 1964.

After dis­cov­ery was con­duct­ed. Fair­brook Med­ical Clin­ic filed a motion for sum­ma­ry judg­ment, and the fed­er­al tri­al judge grant­ed it. The tri­al judge rea­soned that the offen­sive con­duct was “not par­tic­u­lar­ly fre­quent,” most­ly involved “the type of crude jokes that do not run afoul of Title VII,” did not cause Dr. Waechter to miss work or feel “severe psy­cho­log­i­cal stress,” and did not include inap­pro­pri­ate touch­ing or phys­i­cal threats.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Was the boss “mere­ly crude”, or was he sex­u­al­ly harass­ing her?

Analysis: The “No Blood No Foul” Rule. When is an Employer’s Conduct Severe Enough to Constitute Retaliation?

I pre­vi­ous­ly wrote about the Supreme Court’s retal­i­a­tion deci­sion in Burling­ton North­ern & Sante Fe Rail­way Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (“Burling­ton North­ern v. White”), in which the US Supreme Court sub­stan­tial­ly broad­ened the abil­i­ty of employ­ees to file retal­i­a­tion claims under Title VII of the Civ­il Rights Act of 1964. It was a unan­i­mous (9–0) decision.

National Basketball Association I want­ed to set out some addi­tion­al thoughts about Burling­ton North­ern, because it address­es an issue that has trou­bled the courts in inter­pret­ing the fed­er­al anti-dis­crim­i­na­tion laws: When is an employ­er’s con­duct seri­ous enough in dis­ad­van­tag­ing an employ­ee so that the employ­ee has a claim under the employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion laws? The answer is easy when the employ­er’s deci­sion affects the employ­ee’s pock­et book, like with ter­mi­na­tion, fail­ure to hire, demo­tions, and the like. The answer has been much hard­er when the employ­er’s con­duct did­n’t direct­ly affect the employ­ee’s pock­et book.

NBA ref­er­ees strug­gle with a sim­i­lar issue: where is there enough phys­i­cal con­tact on the court to jus­ti­fy call­ing a foul on a play­er. So let’s explore some par­al­lels between these employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion issues and the NBA’s “no blood no foul” rule.

The NBA’s “No Blood No Foul” Rule

If you watch Nation­al Bas­ket­ball Asso­ci­a­tion games, you might be struck by how much phys­i­cal con­tact there is on the court and how rarely the ref­er­ees call per­son­al fouls over that phys­i­cal con­tact. Fans of the NBA have only a par­tial­ly kid­ding way to refer to the “stan­dard” by which the ref­er­ees decide how much con­tact will result in a per­son­al foul being called. It’s the “no blood no foul” rule. In oth­er words, the ref­er­ees will allow a lot of phys­i­cal con­tact, and will only call a foul when some­one gets blood­ied as a result of the con­tact.

Let’s assume, with our tongues in our cheeks, that there is such a rule (no blood no foul) that NBA ref­er­ees apply, regard­less of what is writ­ten in the Offi­cial Rules. The idea behind the “no blood no foul” rule is this: there is so much fast-paced hur­ley-burly con­tact on the bas­ket­ball court, much of which makes it more excit­ing for the fans, that call­ing a foul for any phys­i­cal con­tact (or a low­er defined lev­el of phys­i­cal con­tact) would slow down the game for fans and make the game less enjoy­able, unrea­son­ably impede the skill of the play­ers, and makes it impos­si­bly hard for offi­cials to iden­ti­fy “con­tact”. So the appear­ance of blood is a more “objec­tive” indi­ca­tion that the con­tact real­ly mat­tered and real­ly con­sti­tut­ed an unfair inter­fer­ence with the oth­er player.

The Supreme Court Struggles With “When is There a Foul”?

Courts for years have strug­gled with the employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion equiv­a­lent of the “no blood no foul” rule. For the courts, assum­ing unlaw­ful dis­crim­i­na­tion occurred: when is the con­se­quence of the dis­crim­i­na­tion seri­ous enough and objec­tive­ly dis­cernible so that courts will rec­og­nize a claim and inter­vene by acti­vat­ing the court’s process and poten­tial­ly award­ing damages.

Except for sit­u­a­tions involv­ing hos­tile work envi­ron­ment, the courts have trans­lat­ed the NBA’s blood require­ment into a tan­gi­ble eco­nom­ic con­se­quence. Thus, much in the spir­it of the NBA, the courts have said eco­nom­ic harm must be demon­stra­ble as a result of dis­crim­i­na­tion, or else the courts won’t enter­tain the claim no eco­nom­ic con­se­quence, no legal vio­la­tion, case dismissed.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Analy­sis: The “No Blood No Foul” Rule. When is an Employer’s Con­duct Severe Enough to Con­sti­tute Retal­i­a­tion?

WV Supreme Court Enforces Employment Arbitration Agreement in Clites v. Clawges, 10–13-09

10–13-09: The West Vir­ginia Supreme Court addressed the enforce­abil­i­ty of employ­ment arbi­tra­tion agree­ments in State ex rel. Clites v. Clawges, 224 W. Va. 299, 685 S.E.2d 693 (2009) (opin­ion at Find­law’s web site). This Clites deci­sion is dis­cussed in my chart of West Vir­ginia Supreme Court deci­sions.

Clites Goes to Work for TeleTech and Signs an Arbitration Agreement

WV Capitol Building The plain­tiff, Jill Clites, went to work for TeleTech in Octo­ber 2004 as a Cus­tomer Ser­vice Rep­re­sen­ta­tive. Dur­ing new employ­ee ori­en­ta­tion, Clites met with a human resources rep­re­sen­ta­tive for about 90 to 120 min­utes, dur­ing which time Clites reviewed and signed a large num­ber of doc­u­ments relat­ed to the ori­en­ta­tion. In the record before the West Vir­ginia Supreme Court, there were dis­putes over whether indi­vid­ual doc­u­ments were dis­cussed with Clites and whether she was required to sing all the doc­u­ments dur­ing the ori­en­ta­tion ses­sion, but it appears that dur­ing that ses­sion Clites signed an arbi­tra­tion agree­ment which TeleTech required of most or all new employees.

Clites remained employed at TeleTech until July 12, 2007, when she was ter­mi­nat­ed. She then filed suit for sex­u­al harass­ment and retal­i­a­tion. Clites alleged she com­plained about the sex­u­al harass­ment, that TeleTech failed to take appro­pri­ate cor­rec­tive action, and that TeleTech retal­i­at­ed against her for the com­plaint by fir­ing her.

Clites Files Suit In West Virginia Circuit Court

Clites filed suit in West Vir­ginia Cir­cuit Court in Mor­gan­town. TeleTech then invoked the arbi­tra­tion agree­ment by fil­ing a motion to dis­miss the law­suit and by fil­ing a sep­a­rate law­suit in fed­er­al court argu­ing that Clites waived her rights to a jury tri­al by sign­ing the arbi­tra­tion agree­ment. In essence, TeleTech argued that Clites gave up her rights to file suit and to a jury tri­al by sign­ing the arbi­tra­tion agree­ment, and that her only rem­e­dy was to file an arbi­tra­tion pro­ceed­ing (with the Amer­i­can Arbi­tra­tion Asso­ci­a­tion) pur­suant to the arbi­tra­tion agreement.

Con­tin­ue read­ing WV Supreme Court Enforces Employ­ment Arbi­tra­tion Agree­ment in Clites v. Clawges, 10–13–09