Category Archives: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Can you be sexually harassed behind your back?

It might be obvi­ous, but it seems a bit dif­fi­cult to win on a claim for sex­u­al harass­ment where all of the harass­ment occurs behind your back (and by “behind your back”, I mean sit­u­a­tions where the harass­ing behav­ior occurs when the com­plain­ing employ­ee is not phys­i­cal­ly present to expe­ri­ence or hear what is happening).

The Fourth Cir­cuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2009), in a unan­i­mous deci­sion writ­ten by Judge Roger Gre­go­ry in which Judges M. Blane Michael and Robert Bruce King joined.

The Fourth Cir­cuit did­n’t have much dif­fi­cul­ty reach­ing the con­clu­sion that, for any claim alleg­ing a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment (includ­ing sex­u­al harass­ment), you can’t suc­ceed if all of the mis­con­duct about which you com­plain occurred at work when you were not at work.

Twenty-Eight Years of Litigation!!!

This case grows out of an incred­i­bly long his­to­ry of lit­i­ga­tion (includ­ing sev­er­al dif­fer­ent law­suits and appeals (some of which were suc­cess­ful)) filed by Ms. Pueschel against her employ­er, the Fed­er­al Avi­a­tion Admin­is­tra­tion (“FAA”). The lit­i­ga­tion start­ed in 1981 and end­ed with this Fourth Cir­cuit deci­sion in 2009 (I am not kid­ding, and I am not sure this deci­sion marks the end of all of her litigation).

Con­tin­ue read­ing Can you be sex­u­al­ly harassed behind your back?

Analysis: The “No Blood No Foul” Rule. When is an Employer’s Conduct Severe Enough to Constitute Retaliation?

I pre­vi­ous­ly wrote about the Supreme Court’s retal­i­a­tion deci­sion in Burling­ton North­ern & Sante Fe Rail­way Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (“Burling­ton North­ern v. White”), in which the US Supreme Court sub­stan­tial­ly broad­ened the abil­i­ty of employ­ees to file retal­i­a­tion claims under Title VII of the Civ­il Rights Act of 1964. It was a unan­i­mous (9–0) decision.

National Basketball Association I want­ed to set out some addi­tion­al thoughts about Burling­ton North­ern, because it address­es an issue that has trou­bled the courts in inter­pret­ing the fed­er­al anti-dis­crim­i­na­tion laws: When is an employ­er’s con­duct seri­ous enough in dis­ad­van­tag­ing an employ­ee so that the employ­ee has a claim under the employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion laws? The answer is easy when the employ­er’s deci­sion affects the employ­ee’s pock­et book, like with ter­mi­na­tion, fail­ure to hire, demo­tions, and the like. The answer has been much hard­er when the employ­er’s con­duct did­n’t direct­ly affect the employ­ee’s pock­et book.

NBA ref­er­ees strug­gle with a sim­i­lar issue: where is there enough phys­i­cal con­tact on the court to jus­ti­fy call­ing a foul on a play­er. So let’s explore some par­al­lels between these employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion issues and the NBA’s “no blood no foul” rule.

The NBA’s “No Blood No Foul” Rule

If you watch Nation­al Bas­ket­ball Asso­ci­a­tion games, you might be struck by how much phys­i­cal con­tact there is on the court and how rarely the ref­er­ees call per­son­al fouls over that phys­i­cal con­tact. Fans of the NBA have only a par­tial­ly kid­ding way to refer to the “stan­dard” by which the ref­er­ees decide how much con­tact will result in a per­son­al foul being called. It’s the “no blood no foul” rule. In oth­er words, the ref­er­ees will allow a lot of phys­i­cal con­tact, and will only call a foul when some­one gets blood­ied as a result of the con­tact.

Let’s assume, with our tongues in our cheeks, that there is such a rule (no blood no foul) that NBA ref­er­ees apply, regard­less of what is writ­ten in the Offi­cial Rules. The idea behind the “no blood no foul” rule is this: there is so much fast-paced hur­ley-burly con­tact on the bas­ket­ball court, much of which makes it more excit­ing for the fans, that call­ing a foul for any phys­i­cal con­tact (or a low­er defined lev­el of phys­i­cal con­tact) would slow down the game for fans and make the game less enjoy­able, unrea­son­ably impede the skill of the play­ers, and makes it impos­si­bly hard for offi­cials to iden­ti­fy “con­tact”. So the appear­ance of blood is a more “objec­tive” indi­ca­tion that the con­tact real­ly mat­tered and real­ly con­sti­tut­ed an unfair inter­fer­ence with the oth­er player.

The Supreme Court Struggles With “When is There a Foul”?

Courts for years have strug­gled with the employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion equiv­a­lent of the “no blood no foul” rule. For the courts, assum­ing unlaw­ful dis­crim­i­na­tion occurred: when is the con­se­quence of the dis­crim­i­na­tion seri­ous enough and objec­tive­ly dis­cernible so that courts will rec­og­nize a claim and inter­vene by acti­vat­ing the court’s process and poten­tial­ly award­ing damages.

Except for sit­u­a­tions involv­ing hos­tile work envi­ron­ment, the courts have trans­lat­ed the NBA’s blood require­ment into a tan­gi­ble eco­nom­ic con­se­quence. Thus, much in the spir­it of the NBA, the courts have said eco­nom­ic harm must be demon­stra­ble as a result of dis­crim­i­na­tion, or else the courts won’t enter­tain the claim no eco­nom­ic con­se­quence, no legal vio­la­tion, case dismissed.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Analy­sis: The “No Blood No Foul” Rule. When is an Employer’s Con­duct Severe Enough to Con­sti­tute Retal­i­a­tion?

US Supreme Court rules pay claims must be filed shortly after discriminatory decision; Ledbetter v Goodyear, 5/29/07

May 29, 2007: In Led­bet­ter v. Goodyear Tire & Rub­ber Com­pa­ny, 550 U.S. 618, 128 S. Ct. 2162 (2007) (Find­Law site opin­ion), the Unit­ed States Supreme Court, in a 5–4 deci­sion, issued an impor­tant deci­sion in a sex dis­crim­i­na­tion case under Title VII of the Civ­il Rights Act of 1964, which sub­stan­tial­ly lim­it­ed the time peri­od avail­able to assert a claim for pay dis­crim­i­na­tion. The Supreme Court affirmed the deci­sion of the Eleventh Cir­cuit in Led­bet­ter v. Goodyear Tire and Rub­ber Com­pa­ny, Inc., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005).

Ledbetter’s Claims of Sex Discrimination and Lower Pay, and the Trial Result

LillyLedbetter Led­bet­ter filed a charge of sex dis­crim­i­na­tion with the EEOC in 1998 and then lat­er in the year retired. She claimed that, years ear­li­er in her career at Goodyear, male super­vi­sors gave her bad per­for­mance reviews com­pared to what men received. She claimed that Goodyear award­ed rais­es based on those per­for­mance reviews, so that her pay rais­es were reduced as a result of the dis­crim­i­na­to­ry per­for­mance reviews.

Led­bet­ter went to tri­al and per­suad­ed the jury that the per­for­mance reviews, years before she filed her EEOC charge, were dis­crim­i­na­to­ry based on her sex, and the jury found her rights had been vio­lat­ed and award­ed her dam­ages based on her low­er pay­checks through­out her career. The tri­al judge entered a “judg­ment” in Led­bet­ter’s favor based on the jury’s ver­dict. So Led­bet­ter won at tri­al on her sex dis­crim­i­na­tion claim under Title VII. The Eleventh Cir­cuit Court of Appeals threw out the jury ver­dict and tri­al court judg­ment for Led­bet­ter, and entered a judg­ment in favor of Goodyear, based on her fail­ure to file her EEOC charge with­in 180 days of when the per­for­mance reviews had been con­duct­ed. The Unit­ed States Supreme Court affirmed, mean­ing that Goodyear won.

Con­tin­ue read­ing US Supreme Court rules pay claims must be filed short­ly after dis­crim­i­na­to­ry deci­sion; Led­bet­ter v Goodyear, 5/29/07